Increased, even sharpened public attention to the process of mass unemployment formation in Russia is conditioned by the fact that the population is growing rapidly. first of all. the very fact of a constant and significant increase in the number of people who have lost and/or cannot find regular paid work. In turn, attempts to understand the essence, dynamics, and prospects of the new (in fact, new, not "well - forgotten old") and alarming social phenomenon were facilitated, on the one hand, by overcoming the forcibly imposed ideas about the long-term absence of unemployment in our country as evidence of the indisputable advantage of socialism, and on the other-by regular (starting with the beginning of socialism) attempts to since 1993) by publishing the main statistical and sociological indicators of the growth and spread of unemployment.

However, initially the predominant form of reaction to this process was the flow of so-called alarmist journalism, i.e., prophecies of the imminent loss of work for tens of millions of people and, accordingly, the total impoverishment of the majority of the country's population, its general marginalization, which became widespread in the early 90s. This was the difference between the publications of not only journalists, but also many scientists. However, the less the predictions of a catastrophic collapse in employment were justified, the more urgent the need for understanding the real course of changes in Russian society became, and the more attention was paid to the scientific analysis of unemployment.

As the study progressed, quite reliable information began to accumulate about trends in the growth of the unemployment rate, changes in its structure and composition, the role of various segments of the population from different regions of the country in its replenishment, the financial situation, social well-being and behavior of the unemployed [1]. It was mainly about the trends of this phenomenon itself, less often about the ratio of and comparison of data on synchronous socio-economic processes. Meanwhile, without a synchronous approach, it is difficult to assess the key factors of unemployment. In particular, to identify the reasons for the slower growth of unemployment in comparison with the rapidly advancing economic crisis. We have attempted a broader approach in which unemployment is considered in the context of general social processes occurring in the transitional Russian society (from 1991 to 1998).

A smaller scale of unemployment and a greater reduction in earnings in Russia (compared to other countries). The rapid increase in unemployment in Russia in the 1990s was one of the most significant signs of the current crisis. Since 1992 (when it was

page 24

Table 1

Unemployment in Russia 1992-1998 (*)

Indicators

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

All unemployed people

- million people

3,6

4,2

5.5

6,4

7,3**

8.1**

8,9

- their share in the economically active population (%)

4.7

5,5

7,4

8,8

10,0

11,3

12,4

Some of them are registered with the employment service

- thousand people

572

835

1637

2327

2506

1999

1926

- their share(%)

0,7

1,1

2,2

3,2

3,4

3,0

2,6

* By the end of the year.

** Data for 1996 and 1997 were adjusted (upwardly) by the State Statistics Committee of Russia based on the results of the labor force survey on employment problems conducted in October 1997 (3)

Until the beginning of 1999, the number of unemployed people increased 2.5 times, i.e. from 3.6 million to almost 9 million, and their share in the economically active population increased from 4.7 to 12.4 % (see Table 1). Nevertheless, the growth rate of Russian unemployment was lower than in the previous year. significantly slower than it would be under the influence of economic factors alone. They turned out to be lower than even in many industrialized and stable societies, where in recent decades, especially in the context of economic downturns, unemployment covered 12-16% of the economically active population. And even now, in many rapidly developing Western European countries, it reaches 10 % (not to mention countries like Spain and Ireland, where up to 20% of able-bodied adults are looking for work) (2).

The situation with unemployment in Russia is noticeably different from the development of similar processes in a number of other former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (4). For example, in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 15-20% of the employed completely lost their jobs during the culmination of the post - socialist crisis. It turns out that the transition crisis in our country was more acute, the decline in production is deeper than in these countries, and the unemployment rate is 1.5 times lower than in other countries. However, each country has its own characteristics, which are clearly shown when comparing the indicators of falling GDP volumes, falling real wages, and the share of the unemployed (see Table 2). They express not only the reaction of employment to market changes, but also a broader problem - the choice by society of the nature of social costs associated with the transition from a state system to a market one. The result of this choice in our country was a kind of replacement at the first stage of reforms of huge unemployment (potentially up to 1/3 of the employed) with a sharp (1.5-2 times) reduction in wages.

As you know, the growth of unemployment is associated with the need to reduce production costs. Theoretically, enterprises can solve this problem either by reducing the number of employees, or by reducing wages. In the first case, the situation of the remaining employees worsens slightly, since the decline in real wages is usually moderate. But immediately and quickly, unemployment starts to rise. In the second case, almost all employees suffer from a reduction in real wages, but unemployment becomes sluggish. It is formed relatively smoothly and has a smaller scale.

In an economic sense, the first option is preferable - the path to the market is more direct and shorter here. But from a social point of view, this option can be more dangerous, especially if you have to reduce a very large share of inefficient production. The revolutionary situation and the offensive of fascism in Germany, the Great Patriotic War

page 25

Table 2

Indicators of the maximum levels of decline in social production, rising unemployment, and falling real wages in Russia and CEE countries in the 1990s

Countries

GDP Volume Index (1989 = 100)

Share of the unemployed in the economically active population (%)

Real wage index (1989 = 100)

Countries with moderate unemployment and a very large decline in real earnings

Russia

57 (1998)

11-12 (1998)

43** (1998)

Romania

79 (1992)

10-11(1994)

55 (1993)

Countries with significant unemployment and a moderate decline in earnings

Poland

83 (1991)

16-17 (1993)

80 (1993)

Hungary

85 (1993)

12-13 (1992)

80 (1995)

Slovakia

78 ( 1993)

15 (1993)

67 (1991)

Countries with a moderate decline in earnings and low unemployment

Czech

80 (1993)

6 (1991)

72 (1991)

Countries with very large declines in earnings and significant unemployment

Bulgaria

67 (1996 .)

17 (1996)

35 (1996)

* Index of GDP and real wages by 1990 (= 100).

** Excluding hidden earnings (5).

The depression of the late 20s and early 30s in the United States clearly demonstrates the danger of excessive unemployment in a market economy. For Russia, which is transforming its non-market economy into a market economy, the threat may be even worse. And it is not clear which is better - a short path to the market, associated with the danger of a social explosion, or a long and sluggish movement that allows you to mitigate the difficulties of the transition. In the West and in a number of CEE countries, the replacement of mass unemployment with lower earnings is rare, in particular because of the high demands of workers who do not agree with such a reduction, as well as because of the general rejection of equalization. In Russia, however, the egalitarian mood, the remnants of paternalistic practices, and the lack of preparation of most of our managers for market conditions have predetermined the possibility of reducing wages while maintaining excessive employment. The reduction of extra workers would lead to huge unemployment (the share of production unnecessary to the market in Russia is higher than anywhere else), additional pressure on the social and political sphere. The choice of a soft reform option was probably the result of a social contract that reflects the interests of different social actors, and not just the political decision of the ruling elites of Russian society (6).

The low level of unemployment in Russia in the 1990s (compared to other countries) is the reverse side of a significant reduction in wages. A 1.5-2-fold decrease in earnings corresponds exactly to a decrease in production volumes and makes it possible to maintain an excess labor force in combination with semi-employment. So, if in 1997 the number of unemployed people in our country exceeded 8 million (more than 11 % of the active population), then according to the estimates of the Ministry of Economy, there were still 12-13 million surplus workers (20% of the working population, or 17-18% of the total economically active population) [7]. In other words, the deep fall in real wages "replaced "about two-thirds of potential unemployment in Russia and, so to speak," damped " the process of expanding its scale.

It is doubtful that it will ever be possible to unambiguously assess the final socio-economic significance of such a "substitution". As in the whole social situation

page 26

the transition time, there are intertwined negative and positive aspects. It is obvious that excessive employment interferes with rational management, makes it difficult to adapt to the market, corrupts labor morals and hinders the formation of an effective market employee. Thus, sluggish, "damped" unemployment creates additional factors that prolong the crisis, contributing to the growth of mass disbelief in reforms and democracy. But at the same time, the same excessive employment in the concrete historical conditions of Russia in the 90s prevents an exorbitant increase in unemployment, which threatens social and socio-psychological overstrain, which can throw the country off the path of modernization and democratization.

It seems that the real significance of" replacing " unemployment with a reduction in wages and maintaining excessive employment depends on the forms and means used to implement this procedure. In Russia in the mid-90s, an effective mechanism for such "replacement" was the practice of organized reduction of the working day and working week, as well as holidays at the initiative of the enterprise administration. Such organized semi-employment is actually supported by a significant part of employees who prefer it to mass layoffs. It is significant that the reduction of working hours and the expansion of the practice of administrative leave have never caused labor conflicts. The majority of employees realize or instinctively feel that part - time work is the lesser evil for them.

However, organized reduction of working hours and administrative leave provided the possibility of replacing mass layoffs with part-time employment not for all potential unemployed people. Such measures covered the number of people equivalent to 1.6 - 1.8 million full-time conditional annual employees in 1996-1997. They, therefore, made it possible not to drive out 10-15% of the surplus labor force. As for the majority of the 12-13 million surplus employees (i.e. potential unemployed) who avoided layoffs in the mid-1990s, their retention at the enterprise was possible due to other mechanisms. Until 1995, the main one was the intense inflationary decline in real earnings. In 1996 - 1997, the main means of reducing wages were massive delays and non-payment of wages, which caused extremely negative consequences of both economic and social nature. Although it was largely the non-payments that made it possible to maintain excess employment and avoid doubling unemployment during these years, they caused a sharp deterioration in the social situation in the country (8).

Of course, with the establishment of market relations and market methods of management, surplus labor will increasingly turn out to be absolutely intolerable. Bringing the number of employees in line with the needs of the economy as a whole and the capabilities of each enterprise will become a categorical imperative of management. Although this does not imply that a catastrophic drop in employment is inevitable, it is nevertheless quite likely that if social policies fail, there may be a significant increase in unemployment, for example, to 15-20% or even 25% of the economically active population (a level typical of crisis situations in many Western countries and corresponding to the current excess employment). In any case, even if an increase in unemployment is avoided, the ability to implement "sparing" employment policies and maintain a surplus of labor will deteriorate dramatically.

In the meantime, the growth of unemployment continues (as before in a slow pace), and some qualitative changes are taking place in the unemployed layer itself. Perhaps the most significant of them is the fact that for an increasing number of unemployed people, this condition stretches for a long time: in 1993, only 18.2% of all unemployed people did not have a permanent job for more than a year, in 1994 - 23 %, in 1995-29.6 %, in 1996-32.5 %, in 1997 - 38.1 %, in 1998-40.9 %. And in times of crisis, the assistance that the employment service in trudo should provide to the unemployed.-

page 27

the organization of your own business, retraining and retraining, is significantly limited. Thus, in 1996, the service employed 1,333 thousand unemployed people (23% of those who were registered), in 1997 - 1,416 thousand (27 %), in 1998-1,218 thousand (26%). In addition, every year about 200-230 thousand unemployed people received assistance in training new professions and retraining [9]. As a result, the trend towards the formation of stagnant unemployment, which merges with the social bottom of our cities, is increasing. It is significant that the share of divorced and unsettled people among the unemployed is one and a half times higher than in the entire economically active population (in 1996, 12-13% and 8-9%, respectively) [10]. This trend has an absolutely negative social significance.

As the scale of unemployment increases and the proportion of long-term unemployed increases in its composition, public concern about this phenomenon itself increases. For example, over the past six years (since March 1993), the share of those who consider unemployment among the most acute problems has steadily increased among VTsIOM respondents: in the first half of 1993, there were less than 1/3 of respondents representing the adult population of Russia, by the end of the year - more than 2/5; in 1994-1995, this indicator was close to 1/2, and in mid - 1998-to 2/3 (although in early 1999 it slightly decreased - to 3/5). However, at the same time, the share of those working respondents who, when asked whether they "may personally lose their jobs in the near future due to staff cuts or liquidation... workplace or enterprise", although it remained high all these years (from 1/3 to 1/2), there was still no tendency for it to increase. Similarly, those who were confident that in this case they would be able to "find another job" in their profession were, in general, not many - no more than half (sometimes a little more), but this indicator remained quite stable. (Notably, the September 1998 survey made almost no changes (11).)

Material status, social and political orientation of the unemployed. Similarity with employee orientations. The slowdown in the growth of unemployment as a result of its "replacement" by a decrease in real incomes determines the peculiarities of the situation of the unemployed layer itself-in comparison with the situation of the majority of the employed population. This can be seen already when comparing the standard of living of those and others. An indisputable consequence of unemployment is an "additional" decrease in the standard of living of a significant part of the population (in addition to what was brought by inflation and delays in the payment of earned money). Millions of people have lost their permanent earnings, and first of all, the overwhelming majority (almost 9/10) of the "registered" unemployed receive unemployment benefits, but a clear minority of all those who have lost and/or are looking for work (in 1996 - a third of all unemployed people, in 1997-a quarter, in 1998-a fifth). Secondly, the benefits are significantly lower than the salary of employees (which is small for the majority): in 1996, the average benefit was 20 %, and in 1997-26 % of the average salary [12]. In addition, unemployment benefits are paid just as irregularly as earnings or pensions. It is significant that late payments of accrued money are considered by the unemployed to be among the most acute problems just as often as those who work: for example, in January 1998, 64% of the first and 67% of the second considered them to be such (although the most acute problem for the unemployed remains, of course, the growth of unemployment) [13].

At the same time, as the materials of various studies show, the incomes of all (and not just registered) unemployed people, if they are inferior to the incomes of the majority of employed people, are not too significant. Thus, according to VTsIOM data in 1997-1998, the average monetary income of the surveyed unemployed from all sources, as well as budget revenues of the families of the unemployed covered by the survey, was less than 1.5 times lower than the income of all employed people, and even less - 1.2-1.3 times-than the income of employees in the public and semi-public sectors of the economy; only However, they were significantly, more than 2 times, higher (see Table 3). As for family incomes, they certainly play a role here

page 28

Table 3

Income (*) and social well-being of the unemployed in comparison with working people (according to VTsIOM data in 1997-1998)

Indicators

All employees (N = 6066)

Including those working in the following sectors:

Unemployed(N=918)

states. (N= 2940)

half a year. (N = 1570)

private(N= 1556)

Average earnings for main and secondary jobs

952

806

796

1388

640

Average per capita household income

590

534

435

852

403

The amount of income required (according to respondents) to live normally

2013

1914

1696

2520

1857

The financial situation of the family is very good, good, average (%)

46

44

41

53

39

Which of the statements is more appropriate to the situation ( % ) - "it's not so bad and you can live" and "it's hard to live, but you can tolerate"

50

48

47

58

47

* In denominated rubles. Sources: Economic and social changes. 1997. N 6, pp. 63-75; Monitoring of public opinion. 1998. N 1, pp. 69-76; N 2, pp. 68-74; N 3, pp. 69-81; N 6, pp. 55-63.

earnings and other monetary contributions of other family members. But after all, the monetary income of the unemployed themselves on average is also not too inferior to the earnings of the majority of employees.

Of course, the average data on earnings and family incomes of the unemployed hides a real differentiation of this stratum. In a survey conducted in November 1998 by VTsIOM, to the question: "What did you personally, individual members of your family and your family as a whole have to give up as a result of the (August 1998) crisis?" the majority of unemployed people said that they had to cut back on food expenses. (80 %), clothing and footwear (74%). At the same time, there are many of them who were forced by the crisis to abandon the purchase of furniture, electrical equipment and other relatively expensive durable goods (37 %) and even from very large expenses - for the purchase of a car (10 %), housing (6 %) and from holidays abroad, tourist trips (5 %) (14). As can be seen, among the unemployed in mid-1998, there were quite a few people of average or even above the average level of prosperity.

True, many people had to squeeze. Thus, as a result of the crisis, 76-77% of respondents from the main working groups were forced to reduce their purchases of food, 72-73% of respondents were forced to reduce their purchases of clothing and footwear, and 40-45% of respondents were forced to reduce their purchases of durable goods. On the other hand, the number of failed car buyers among working respondents was even slightly lower - 8-9%, although the number of home buyers was about the same (6-8 %). And only in terms of the share of those forced to abandon expensive types of recreation, working people are 1.5-3 times ahead of the unemployed (8-15 %). The great similarity in the welfare of the working and unemployed can only be explained by the fact that people who have lost their jobs are trying (and many are not without success) to compensate for the loss of earnings, as well as for the low level of benefits and other types of social assistance. For example, in 1997 - 1998, 30 % of the surveyed unemployed admitted that they had some additional earnings, while about 15% of working respondents said that they had additional earnings (15). However, the unemployed are less likely to have regular jobs and more likely to have casual ones. Many unemployed people work part-time without

page 29

those who have formal employment relationships spend almost twice as much time on part-time work as workers (16).

The presence of people in this state, although it throws them "on the sidelines of life", but does not turn most of them into marginals. It is no coincidence that many of the unemployed in the course of surveys demonstrate the level of needs and claims no lower than that of the majority of employed people. Thus, their perceptions of the amount of income needed "to live normally" are in principle quite comparable to those of workers employed in the public and semi-public sectors, and only slightly lower than those of workers in the private sector. In other words, the majority of unemployed people are characterized by an attitude towards a more decent standard of living, and not just for survival. Similarly, the share of unemployed people who believe that the minimum subsistence level is a level of modest but decent living does not differ much from the same indicator for all employed people (71 % and 65-83 %). The share of those who rate it as good or average is only slightly lower among the unemployed (39%) than among the employed (46 %, including 56% in the private sector). Almost half of the unemployed people believed that in the current situation "everything is not so bad and you can live" or, at least, that "it is difficult to live, but you can tolerate" - the same number of them were among the working people (see Table 3).

Indicators of protest activity of the main socio-professional groups of the employed population also differ little from those of the unemployed. Finally, the political sympathies of the unemployed and all the employed are similar. It is important to note that the unemployed are not at all characterized by the orientation that can be expected from a marginal group. Therefore, the unemployed should not be unconditionally included in the political reserve of the left. In this stratum, as in the whole society, complex processes of differentiation and identification of political orientations have taken place and are still taking place.

The similarity of the social status of the unemployed and employed is evidenced by the data on the self-identification of both with the social strata of different levels that make up the transformed Russian society. Thus, according to a survey conducted by VTsIOM in November 1998, 11% of the unemployed and 6% of the employed respondents classified themselves as the lowest stratum, 32% and 39% as workers, 17% and 17% as the lowest part of the middle stratum, 21% and 27% as the middle stratum, and the highest the middle layer and the upper layer (together) - 3 and 2.5 % (the lowest layer is excluded from the answer options - the social bottom, which is "not felt" by such surveys) (17).

After August - September 1998, in the context of a sharp deterioration in the socio-economic situation, all indicators of the social well-being of the unemployed naturally became noticeably more negative, but in general (and this is especially important to note), in proportion to what was happening in the employed in all sectors of the economy. It is also significant that the deterioration of the situation in this group gave rise to panic moods no more than in the majority of working people. However, the potential to support reforms in this group of unemployed people has decreased to a greater extent than among the employed.

The unemployed as an integral part of the economically active population and as a special stratum. Heterogeneous composition and conflicting interests. So, the unemployed (of course, with the inevitable spread of specific facts) assess their financial situation, the situation in the economy and society as a whole in about the same way as the majority of employed people, and the moods of both are not too different. Moreover, as follows from the data on the monetary income of unemployed people, very many of them-despite their "official" or self-declared status-are not such in the strict sense. All this, apparently, can be interpreted in the sense that the unemployed actually do not form a special relatively homogeneous layer, which is in a stable marginal position. Rather, they constitute an intermediate, fluid category of the economically active

page 30

the population of a country characterized by the absence of a permanent job or income-generating employment. This is, of course, a reserve army of labor, part of which participates in social production on a permanent or temporary basis, in legal or illegal forms.

It is not surprising that the unemployed respond to current problems in the same way as their fellow workers. The reason is that unemployment in our country has arisen quite recently, and the experience of staying in such a state for many who have lost their jobs is still not too great. However, the average search time for a new job, which was 4.4 months in 1992, increased to 9.1 months by 1998 and continues to increase [18]. But still, many people who have lost their jobs or have not found them, find a new job in a fairly short time. And hence-intensive updatability of this layer. According to R. Kapelyushnikov's calculations, every month up to 20 % of the unemployed are replaced by new ones. In his opinion, this circumstance does not allow attributing Russian unemployment to a "particularly stagnant character". In this case, there is no "sluggishness"in its development. With such a high intensity of the exchange of "personnel" between the unoccupied and employed parts of the population, there is still a great closeness of both, which is manifested in a high level of coincidence of assessments of the socio-economic situation and social well-being in general.

It can be assumed that the economically active population of Russia consists not of two distinct strata (employed and unemployed), but at least of three (permanently employed - semi - employed - semi-unemployed-unemployed). The differences between the first and second groups and between the second and third groups are not very significant, which causes a relatively slow transition from one socio - psychological state to another. The similarity of the mass consciousness of the unemployed and employed also contributes to the similarity of the socio-demographic and cultural-qualification composition of both categories. In 1996, the ratio of men and women was 53: 47 among the employed and 55: 45 among the unemployed. The shares of the main socio-professional groups were also approximately the same: specialists among the former were 20 %, workers-50 %, and among the latter-19 and 65 % (according to the last place of work). Differences in age and education were more significant. Almost 39% of those under the age of 30 were unemployed, while 29% were employed (respectively, the proportion of older people over the age of 50 was 11 and 19%). In turn, unemployed people with higher education accounted for 11 % of this stratum, while the share of such people in the employed reached 19 % (19). These differences have their own reasons (for example, a large proportion of young people among the unemployed is due, on the one hand, to various difficulties in starting working life, and on the other, to the fact that there is an intensive outflow of workers from older age groups of the employed population, not only to the ranks of the unemployed, but also to retirement, household and subsidiary But they are not so large as to produce significant differences in sociocultural attitudes and, accordingly, behavioral standards.

However, the more often the able-bodied population withdraws from social production for a long period of time, the more typical features of the situation and, accordingly, group interests will develop in the unemployed layer. Thus, it is unlikely that the fact that unemployed people have significantly more relatives, friends, and acquaintances who also lost their jobs than those who are employed can remain without consequences. But this means that the unemployed are much more likely than working people to communicate with people who have lost and/or do not have a permanent income-generating occupation.

Internally, the unemployed layer is quite heterogeneous. It consists of people who are out of work and do not find it due to objective (economic) circumstances, and those who cannot get out of the situation due to their intelligence, character or health, and, finally, those who become unemployed by their own choice, solving some of their own problems in this way., so to speak, transients

page 31

tasks (20). On the other hand, among the unemployed there are both those who have managed (or hope) to adapt to the current situation (there are even those who benefit from it, for example, successfully earning extra money in addition to the benefit), and those who, for various reasons, hope only for state assistance. Such heterogeneity is manifested, in particular,in the ratio of indicators of actual and "official" unemployment. For several years, the rapid growth in the number of unemployed people was accompanied by a systematic increase in the proportion of those who registered with the employment service: in 1992-16 %, in 1993-20 %, in 1994-30 %, in 1995-36 %. However, then this indicator began to decline-at first slightly-to 34 % in 1996, and then faster - to 24 % in 1997 and 22 % in 1998. Consequently, not all of the people who lost or did not have a job apply to the employment service. It is no coincidence that there are more men than women among such "deviators", more young people than middle - aged and elderly people, and more rural residents than urban residents (21). Many of them rely on their own resources, and not on the help of the state.

Among the unemployed, there are many people whose standard of living has fallen very much - to the lowest poverty line, who have despaired of regaining their former social status and therefore extremely negatively assesses both the changes taking place in the country and the prospects for its development. They are relegated to the position of marginals and feel marginalized. Although even in this stratum there are many people who successfully resist the process of marginalization and more or less successfully solve their material problems. They are less susceptible to moods of despair and pessimism. It is their "voices" that bring the average indicators of the socio-psychological state of the unemployed to the level corresponding to that characteristic of the majority of employed people.

At least two conclusions follow from all this. The first conclusion is that we have mass unemployment, which, although it has not reached its peak values, is causing the financial situation of the popular majority to worsen, even marginalizing it. According to the second conclusion, the expansion of unemployment in Russia turned out to be a very complex and contradictory process with ambiguous consequences. On the one hand, it, like everywhere else in societies with a market economy, has become a kind of "reservation", where those who, due to objective reasons (employees of industries and enterprises that do not adapt well to the market, residents of depressed regions, etc.) or due to subjective circumstances, were superfluous in the transforming economy fall. Some of them, as the demand for labor increases, return to production, while others finally drop out of it. On the other hand, unemployment plays the role of a specific school of adaptation to new conditions, especially for young people, and partly for the middle generation. The role of" reservation " is assumed by production itself, with its excessive employment. On the contrary, many of those who go through such a school precisely as part of the unemployed, especially those who are forced by unemployment to become more active, to master the skills of market-type work, often remain unclaimed by production, the restructuring of which is delayed. As a result, the unemployed and employed live, so to speak, in a single socio-economic and socio - psychological space.

notes

The paper uses the results of research carried out within the framework of the project "Social Development of Russian Society", funded by the Russian Foundation for Scientific Research (N 98-03-04146) "Social situation and socio-economic human rights", funded by the D. and K. MacArthur Foundation.

1. See: Babushkina T. A., Unemployment: youth aspect//Trudovye otnosheniya i kollektivnye deystviya v sovremennoi Rossii: politicheskie, pravovye i sotsial'nye aspekty [Labor relations and collective actions in Modern Russia: political, Legal and social Aspects]. 1998. N 2; V. Gimpelson. Dismissed employees on the labor market: search for a new job and mechanisms of social adaptation. Sotsial'no-trudovye issledovaniya [Social and labor Research]. Issue IV, Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 1996; Gordienko A. A., Poshevnev G. S., Plyusnin Yu. M. Struktura povedeniya bezobozhnogo [Structure of unemployed behavior]. SOTSIS. 1996. N 11; Gruzdeva

page 32

E.B. Zhenshchaya doblozhtsa v Rossii [Women's unemployment in Russia], Moscow, 1995; Danovsky SL. Social typology of the unemployed / / Man and Labor. 1993. N 5-6; same name. Sotsiologicheskaya i psikhologicheskaya kharakteristika bezobozhnykh [Sociological and psychological characteristics of the unemployed]. SOTSIS. 1994. N 5; Dunaeva N. Molodezh na rynke truda [Youth on the labor market] // Economic issues. 1998, No. 1; Kapelyushnikov R. I. Dvizhenie rabochoi sily i rabochikh mesto v rossiiskoi promyshlennosti [Movement of labor force and jobs in the Russian industry]. 1998. N 2; Kartashov S. A., Danovsky SL. Social dynamics of unemployment in Moscow. SOTSIS. Social Conflict, 1996, No. 2; Osadchaya G. I. Families of the unemployed and family policy // Social Conflict, 1996, No. 12; Klementieva A. Ya.Social tension and conflict of the unemployed // Social Conflict, 1996, No. 2; Osadchaya G. I. Families of the unemployed and family policy / / SOCIS. 1997. N 1; Polyakova N. Nezanyataya molodezhi: sotsial'no - ekonomicheskii portret i povedenie [Unoccupied youth: socio-economic portrait and behavior]. 1999. N 4; Popov A. Registered unemployment in 1992-1997: women against men / / Voprosy statistiki. 1998. N 11; Feofanov K. A. Tsennostno - normativnyj aspekt nezroblozhnosti v Rossii [Value-normative aspect of unemployment in Russia]. 1995. N 5; Chernit N. V. Social problems of the unemployed (Novosibirsk region) / / SOCIS. 1996. N 11; Chetaernina T. Position of the unemployed and state policy on the labor market // Economic issues. 1997. N 2; Chukreev P. A. Unoccupied: moods, expectations, and intentions. Ulan-Ude Publ., 1996. Various aspects of the situation of the unemployed are also considered in connection with the analysis of the problems of the new stratification of Russian society (for example, in the collective monograph "Poverty: alternative Approaches to definition and measurement". Moscow, 1998, and in N. E. Tikhonova's book "Factors of Social stratification in the transition to a market economy", Moscow, 1999). The results of the most interesting studies of foreign scientists on the problems of Russian unemployment are published in: Structural adjustment without mass unemployment? Lesson from Russia / Ed. by Simon Clarke. - Suffolk, 1998.

2. See Russia and other countries of the world. 1992. Moscow, 1994, pp. 32-33; Russia and the countries of the world. 1996. Moscow, 1996, pp. 30-32, 40-45.

3. Main results of the activity of the State Employment Service bodies in January-December 1998. Statbulleten N 12. Moscow, 1999, p. 3; Rossiyskiy stat. yearbook. 1998. Moscow, 1998, p. 173; Russia in the figures of 1996. Moscow, 1996, p. 33; Voprosy statistiki. 1998. N 2, p. 66; N 9, p. 85; 1999, N 5.. p. 96.

4. This is convincingly shown in the report of P. M. Kapelyushnikov "The Russian labor market: adaptation without restructuring" /Some aspects of the theory of transition economy, Moscow, IMEMO RAS, 1999, pp. 85-162.

5. From crisis to Growth (Experience of transition countries) Edited by Zh. Deryabina, Moscow, 1998, pp. 76-90; Economics of Transition. London, 1997, Vol. 5, p. 530-552.

6. However, the well-known researcher of the problems of the formation of the labor market in Russia (now deceased) I. Zaslavsky was inclined to conclude that such a course of events was not spontaneous, but purposeful, that "the reduction in wages was actually used to maintain employment and prevent the growth of unemployment" and thereby to restore the "borrowed Soviet history" paradigm) "providing employment to the detriment of efficiency" and, correspondingly, for strengthening mechanisms regulating the movement of hired labor (Zaslavsky I. Bitter medicines to recover / / Man and Labor. 1996. N 12).

7. Main performance indicators of the State Employment Service in January-December 1997 Statbulleten. M., 1998, p. 5.

8.At the same time, even in 1997-1998, when such an escalation came close to the dangerous threshold of a social explosion (recall the "rail war" of spring and summer 1998), many workers agreed to this method of preventing mass layoffs and a catastrophic increase in unemployment. For example, in November 1997 and September 1998 (i.e. shortly before and shortly after these events), working respondents were asked: "If your company finds itself in a difficult situation, what would you prefer?". Almost 53 % in the first case and 49% in the second chose the answer - " to... the workplace was preserved even if the salary is not paid in time or in full" - and only 15 and 18 % preferred "dismissal with subsequent registration with the employment service and payment of unemployment benefits" (Public opinion monitoring. 1998. N 2, p. 75-76; N 6, p. 68).

9. Statistical Bulletin of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation, Moscow, May 1999, p. 71; Osnovnye pokazateli deyatel'nosti organov Gosudarstvennoi sluzhby zanyatii v Jan-Dec 1997, p. 9.

10. Social status and standard of living of the Russian population. Stat. collection. Moscow, 1997, p. 38.49.

11. Economic and social changes. 1993. N 7, p. 65; 1994. N 4, p. 70; N 6, p. 82; 1995. N 1, p. 79; N 3, p. 82; 1997. N 2, p. 88; N 5, p. 47; N 6, p. 86; Monitoring of public opinion. 1998. N 3, p. 90-91; N 5, p. 57; N 6, p. 68; 1999. N 2, p. 56.

12. The main indicators of activity of bodies of the State employment service in January-December 1997, p. 8; statistical Issues. 1999. N 2, p. 88.

13. Monitoring of public opinion. 1998. N 3, pp. 90, 91.

14. Ibid., 1999, No. 1, p. 71.

15. Ibid., 1997. N 6, p. 69; 1998. N 6, p. 58

16. Perova I., Khakhulina L. Estimation of income from unregistered additional employment //Ibid., 1998. N 3.

17. Monitoring of public opinion. 1999. N 1, pp. 69, 73. Of course, can be offered (and prev-

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Other models of social stratification of modern Russian society are also discussed. Moreover, as N. E. Tikhonova has well shown, the self-identification of respondents gives different (though correlated) distributions when referring to different models (see N. E. Tikhonova, Factors of social stratification in the transition to a market economy, pp. 62-66). However, the option proposed by VTsIOM experts also allows us to identify trends in the stratification process and the proportions of respondents ' self-identification with different social strata.

18. Statistical Bulletin of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 1999, No. 3, p. 71.

19. Social status and standard of living of the Russian population. 1997. Other surveys give slightly different ratios. Thus, among 2,273 unemployed people surveyed by VTsIOM from March 1993 to March 1994, the relative predominance of young people among the unemployed was even more impressive (38% versus 24% among the employed), and the prevalence of people with higher education among the employed was, on the contrary, less - 21 and 18%, respectively (see: Economic Indicators of Employment). and social change. 1994. N 6, pp. 87-89).

20. A great expert on these problems, I. Zaslavsky, wrote about "subjective unemployment associated with the problem of choosing a new alternative", and about " marginal unemployment, when tens of thousands of homeless people and other inhabitants of the "bottom" of society appeared on the official labor market " (On the characteristics of labor in modern Russia (essay on social and labor policy) / / Voprosy ekonomiki. 1997. N 2. p. 78).

21. See: Social status and standard of living of the Russian population. 1997, pp. 38.47-52; Russia in figures. 1998, p. 47-48; Voprosy statistiki, 1999. N 2, p. 88. Very significant differences in gender and age composition and education between unemployed people registered in the employment service and their entire mass are considered in the article Kuddo A. Employment policy in Russia in the context of international economic experience / / State and Corporate Employment Policy. Moscow, 1998, pp. 46-50.

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