Fagan G. Believing in Russia - Religious Policy after Communism. London & New York: Routledge, 2013. - 304 p.

Works about Russia written by foreigners often have a characteristic drawback - despite all the mastery of the material, the authors fail to understand the general context, which sometimes leads them to rather dubious conclusions. Fortunately, the same cannot be said for Geraldine Fagan's Faith in Russia: Religious Politics After Communism. Feigan's research is devoted to the analysis of religious freedoms in Russia, starting from the late 90s of the XX century and ending with the tenth years of the XXI century. In fact, as the author himself points out, this is "the first systematic history of religious politics in Russia since the collapse of the USSR" (p.xiii).

This work is the result of the author's many years of work as a Moscow correspondent for the Norwegian organization Forum 18 News Service, which has been monitoring violations of religious freedoms in different countries of the world since 2003. The organization's activities are based on the principles of article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which " everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change one's religion or belief and freedom to manifest one's religion or belief, alone or in community with others, in public or private, in teaching,teaching, worship and performance of religious and ritual rites"¹. Consistent adherence to these principles can be traced both in the narrative itself and in the author's overall concept.

The main post-Soviet dilemma that was never solved,

^1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 18//Official UN website. http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/declhr.shtml [доступ от 08.04.2013].

according to Feygan, it is allowed by the Russian authorities, formulated by the author as follows: is Russia "an Orthodox country with religious minorities" or "a multi-confessional state in which all religious associations are equal before the law"? Actually, the work is devoted to the consideration of various aspects of this dilemma; at the same time, Fagan herself does not hide the fact that her sympathies are clearly on the side of the second option. Each chapter reveals a specific story related to the history of religious politics in post-Soviet Russia. The first chapter is devoted to "the tradition of religious freedom in Russia". Here the author tries to show that the idea of religious freedom is not exclusively a Western borrowing: it is inextricably linked with the history of Russia itself. In particular, the author draws attention to the Old Believers and Molokans as "two purely Russian faiths, at least indifferent to the West, who have historically supported religious freedom" (p. 7). Feigan also mentions Buddhists in Buryatia, Kalmykia, and Tuva as other carriers of the ideas of religious freedom. The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of "the network of post-Soviet relations between the state, the population and the Russian Orthodox Church". The author explores the multidimensional relations between Church and state in the post - Soviet period-the degree of religiosity of the Russian population, the idea of a symphony of Church and state, the ecclesiastical orientation of elites (in particular, President Vladimir Putin, and then Dmitry Medvedev). Feygan shows that the Church, on the one hand, tries to strengthen its position based on the idea of its special role in the history and culture of the country, and the state, on the other hand, pursues its own line, connected both with the involvement of the Church in the orbit of power, and with its retention at a certain distance.

The next two chapters cover the history of religious legislation, from the 1990 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations to the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations. The author meticulously reconstructs the chronology of the discussions that accompanied the adoption of these documents; she analyzes the circumstances that led the state to adopt the 1997 law, which significantly complicated the lives of many religious organizations and nuanced the religious freedoms that were guaranteed-

in the country under Mikhail Gorbachev. In particular, one of these circumstances is the position of the Russian Orthodox Church, which called on the authorities, both through the patriarch and through their lobbyists in state bodies, to become "more selective in their support for non-traditional religious associations."

The 1997 law, as Feigan shows, did not suit either side - the additional restrictions it imposed on the activities of religious associations (for example, a fifteen-year presence on the territory of the Russian Federation), on the one hand, frightened representatives of "non-traditional confessions" and plunged them into paperwork related to re-registration and court proceedings, and on the other - they did not satisfy all the hopes of the Russian Orthodox Church (thanks to the efforts of Andrey Sebentsov, one of the key officials on religious organizations, the law was interpreted in a way that was quite sparing for "non-traditional religions"). However, this story related to post-Soviet religious politics is quite well known, so here the author hardly managed to present any new details and details.

The participants ' dissatisfaction with the legal aspect of the case set in motion a very complex system of quasi-legal mechanisms for further nuancing religious freedom. The analysis of these mechanisms may well be considered the most interesting part of Fagan's research. The final part of the fourth chapter is devoted to this subject, as well as the three sections of the book that follow it.

The first of the mechanisms considered by the author is the so-called "telephone law", which allows officials to solve many issues behind the scenes, bypassing any legal procedures and legislative acts. The essence of telephone law is simple - decisions are made on a call from a higher authority, while the task of the one who received instructions from above is to come up with a more or less legal way to fulfill it. "Telephone law", according to Feigan, is one of the most common tools for restricting religious freedom, especially in the regions. For example, a similar method was often used to cancel scheduled meetings of religious organizations: members of various Protestant communities could come to the designated meetings of religious organizations.-

at a certain hour, they go to the Cultural Center they rented and suddenly find that the latter is closed due to a water main break or some other emergency. The effectiveness of the" telephone law " is due to the fact that it is not recorded anywhere and in any way, and, accordingly, it is extremely difficult to challenge it. The essence of such a right, in particular, is described by Andrey Berdishchev, a Pentecostal pastor from the Sverdlovsk region, quoted by Feigan: "The mayor acts only if he has received a sanction from the governor, and then on a descending basis. If you start quoting the law, the answer will be: the law was written somewhere in Moscow, and we will have to deal with the consequences here if anything happens " (p. 87). However, "telephone law" does not always go unpunished: Fagan mentions at least two cases where such abuse of power has been successfully challenged in the European Court of Human Rights (p. 87).

From the well-known "telephone" law, Feygan proceeds to consider much more sophisticated mechanisms: concepts that, on the one hand, have no legal status, and on the other, have a real significant impact on the adoption of political and sometimes judicial decisions. These quasi-legal concepts form the discourse in which officials, the media and ordinary citizens begin to discuss issues related to religion. The author analyzes four main quasi-legal concepts: "totalitarian sect", "spiritual security", "canonical territory" and "traditional religion". In addition to their non-legal nature, these concepts are also extremely vague and vague, which makes them very convenient tools for discrediting certain religious organizations. Judging by the author's calculations based on the frequency of mention of these concepts in the Russian media (p. 96), they have been entering public discourse since the mid-90s, but they have been experiencing their real rise since the zero years of the XXI century.

Feigan begins his analysis with the concept of " totalitarian sect "(analogous to"destructive cult"). This is a concept that the Orthodox "sectologist" Alexander Dvorkin (since April 2009, Chairman of the Expert Council for Conducting State Religious Studies Expertise under the Ministry of Justice) has played a significant role in spreading.-

Russian Federation), was used by opponents of unrestricted religious freedom to justify the need to ban the activities of certain religious organizations in view of their potential threat to society/family/individuals. Due to the vagueness of this concept, any objectionable religious trend can be summed up under it. So, in particular, A. Dvorkin used this concept not only against little-known and small religious groups, but also against religious movements that have been present in Russia for many decades, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and Pentecostals (p. 96). Feiganan analyzes so far unsuccessful attempts to introduce this concept into the legal field. In particular, the author cites conferences organized by dioceses together with local authorities as one of the tools of such legalization. Despite its quasi-legal status, the concept of "totalitarian sect" has already appeared in many episodes: Feigan mentions the disruption of the summer congress of Jehovah's Witnesses in 2005, the cancellation of the construction of a new temple for Hare Krishnas, as well as problems with the construction of the Moscow temple near Molokans in 2001 (p. 99-101). In all these cases, the word "totalitarian sect" appeared among the informal reasons for justifying the decisions taken/not taken by the authorities.

The next concept analyzed by the author is "spiritual security". References to the danger that some religious organizations pose to the spiritual climate of the country have often been used since the noughties to fight against foreign religious organizations and preachers. For example, Fagan cites numerous examples of visa denials to American Salvation Army representatives precisely for reasons of "national security interests" (p. 103). The origins of this concept go back to the Concept of National Security adopted by Vladimir Putin in January 2000, which lists "cultural and religious expansion into the territory of Russia" among the current threats and calls for "countering the negative influence of foreign religious organizations and missions" (p. 103-104). Further, "spiritual security" begins to appear in numerous expert reports, as well as in messages on specialized websites.

Conferences: In 2002, the then Chairman of the Committee on Public Associations and Religious Organizations, Viktor Zorkaltsev, at a conference in the Presidential Administration, mentioned "spiritual security" in his report as one of the important elements of the national security strategy (p. 105). The main victims of this quasi-legal concept are numerous representatives of primarily Protestant denominations who are engaged in an active mission - they face constant problems in obtaining visas, and are also under the permanent threat of deportation from the country. In general, according to the author, "foreign missionary activity today is increasingly perceived as a dangerous threat precisely because of the successful dissemination of the concept of "spiritual security" " (p. 110).

Next, Fagan analyzes the concept of "canonical territory". If the concept of "spiritual security" goes back to the special services, then the concept of" canonical territory " goes back to the church environment. According to the analysis of domestic mass media, by the mid-noughties, it received a fairly large media distribution (1,252 cases of use in 2008, p. 110). The idea of the existence of a" canonical territory " was primarily directed against the attempts of the Catholic Church to strengthen its presence on the territory of Russia. Feigan mentions as a turning point the events of early February 2002, when Catholics plotted to turn their four Russian apostolic administrations into dioceses, which provoked quite a sharp reaction from the Russian Orthodox Church, which accused the Catholics of attempting "spiritual expansion against the Orthodox people" (p. 110). Paradoxically, this concept has entered the lexicon of secular authorities as well. In particular, Feigan quotes the outraged reaction of Vatican representatives to the attempts of the Russian authorities to talk to them in the logic of "canonical territories": "We keep telling Russian officials:" We can discuss the concept of canonical territory, which we deny, with the Russian Orthodox Church, but not with YOU; you are like any other civil organization the Administration, have signed and must adhere to international human rights agreements that the GA-

they grant religious freedom to individuals, not to entire territories. Therefore, don't come out to us with this idea"" (p. 118). Like all other quasi-legal concepts, the concept of "canonical territory" is vague and ambiguous: as the author emphasizes, neither the boundaries of this territory nor the theological status of this term itself are clear - if the Orthodox Church is the guardian of the true faith, then it should spread this faith around the world, and not limit the area of its existence to one specific region.

Finally, the sixth chapter of the work is devoted to the consideration of probably the most widespread concept that restricts religious freedom, according to Fagan: the concept of "traditional religions". In terms of frequency of use, it is quite far ahead of all other quasi-legal concepts. With the help of this concept, opponents of the idea of equality of all religions before the law try to separate those of them that are native to Russia and therefore have the right to some advantages over all others. Traditional religions, based on the preamble to the 1997 law (although the concept of "traditional religions" does not appear in it), usually include Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. Feigan rightly points out the difficulties faced by any attempt to give "traditional religions" a more or less clear definition: first, it is not clear how many years you need to exist on the territory of Russia to get the status of a traditional religion; secondly, each region of the Russian Federation has its own specifics and, accordingly, its own applicants Third, it is not clear which organization can be recognized as a legitimate representative of a particular traditional religion, especially if there are many trends and trends in this religion. Finally, as Feigan notes, even among the generally recognized traditional religions, there is some competition: they are not always ready to see other traditional religions as an equal partner - for example, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church often insist that it is Orthodoxy that should become the state - forming religion in the Russian Federation, and all others are only religious minorities. As in the case of other quasi-

according to the concept, the discourse of traditionalism allows some religions to claim special rights: in the case of Orthodoxy, Feigan focuses on successful attempts to introduce the course "Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture", as well as on the interaction of the Church with the armed forces.

In general, Feigan concludes his analysis of quasi-legal concepts with the conclusion that" these concepts, due to their ability to switch public discursive boundaries towards an Orthodox-oriented model of Russian national identity, have successfully undermined the Russian legal principle of equality of all religious associations before the law " (p. 120).

The seventh chapter of the book is devoted to the analysis of another mechanism that is successfully used to restrict religious freedom. We are talking about the fight against extremism and the corresponding anti-extremist legislation. Naturally, special attention is paid in this section to the fight against Islamism, but, as the author shows, it is not limited to Islam alone. In the section " The expanding net of extremism "(p. 166), the author shows that even such universally recognized traditional religions as Judaism at some point became targets for fighters against extremism-Feigan draws attention to the calls of deputies in 2005 to check the Jewish code "Shulchan Aruch" for extremism. The anti-extremist legislation became particularly well-known in connection with the Federal List of Extremist Materials, which, according to the decision of regional judges, periodically included works of pagan, Islamic, Scientology, and Jehovah's orientation. In this practice, Feigan sees a repetition of the Soviet anti-religious policy, which also fought against "non-traditional" religious movements under the guise of fighting extremism (p. 171).

Despite all the unquestionable advantages of Feigan's work, it should be noted that such studies in the conditions of today's Russia manage to become outdated even before they leave the printing house. This work, in which, of course, there is no fault of the author, suffered the same fate. It is already clear that at least one additional chapter is needed in the work, in particular, on the problem of" blasphemy "and"blasphemy". These quasi-legal concepts are:-

but they have gained a foothold in the public discourse largely due to the hype surrounding the Pussy Riot case and the scandalous "punk prayer". And given the fact that since the end of 2012, the State Duma has been discussing in various formats the introduction of criminal liability for " insulting religious beliefs and feelings of citizens "(the secular equivalent of "blasphemy" and "blasphemy"), these concepts have every chance to become another tool for restricting religious freedoms.

Feigan's work is distinguished by its transparent design and well-constructed structure: the book reads like a fascinating detective story about how Russia abandoned religious freedom and embarked on the path of its gradual restriction through legal and semi-legal measures. The beneficiary of this process, according to the author, is the Russian Orthodox Church. In the final pages of his work, the author states that such an Orthodox-centered model is not viable: "A Russian identity built around Orthodoxy cannot consolidate the modern Russian nation" (p. 194). As an example of this inability, the author points to politics in the Caucasus, where in some regions local elites pursue pro-Islamic policies that often directly contradict the Russian Constitution. Moreover, as Feigan points out, "the Kremlin's failure to pursue a consistent line aimed at strengthening the religious freedom guaranteed in the Constitution means that today there is no reliable barrier that would prevent further deterioration of the situation" (p. 194). Trying to understand how this happened, Feygan alternates between pointing out the inaction of the federal authorities, which allowed regional elites to follow the lead of regional religious lobbyists (p. 195), and hinting at the deliberate policy of the federal center, which is trying to strengthen the foundation of its own power at the expense, in particular, of the Orthodox Church, which receives certain administrative privileges for this support.

The recipe offered by Feygan for getting out of this situation is simple - you just need to return to the ideal of religious freedom and rely not on Orthodoxy as the core of the Russian "imaginary community", but on all the many different faiths that exist on the territory of modern Russia. It is this moral pathos that is simply-

The "return to religious freedom" approach, which runs through the entire study, can be considered the weakest and most unconvincing component of the work. The point is that the transformations of religious policy so scrupulously described by Fagan should probably be considered as a rather clumsy attempt by the state to develop a model of interaction with religious organizations that is suitable for Russia, which would take into account all the nuances of Russian reality in its past and present (and not just the fact of a simple multiplicity of beliefs, as). The state tries to maneuver between influential religious organizations (taking into account their political/economic / moral influence) and legislative norms. It is unlikely that the departure from religious freedom in the 1990s was dictated by any particular sympathies for Orthodoxy, rather it was pure pragmatism; at least this is evidenced by the rather cynical comments of some Kremlin officials (for example, Maxim Meyer), as well as the statements of top state officials who are rushing from declaring equality for all. to some reservations regarding this equality; reservations that would take into account the positions of different interest groups present on the territory of the Russian Federation.

But still, despite some of the above critical considerations, we must admit that J. Feigan wrote a very valuable work, which can be considered as a textbook for those who decided to understand all the vicissitudes of post-Soviet religious politics.

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